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THE IMPENDING COLLAPSE OF THE
EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION
Charles W. Calomiris
European monetary union will centralize control over European
currency. Some have argued that the scale of this new currency area
will cause a leap in demand for European currency as a numeraire
and store of value. Furthermore, reductions in transactions and hedg-
ing costs from currency homogeneity within Europe could increase
European wealth and income.
It is argued that this change would be beneficial to the world
economy, not just to Europe. Giving other countries the ability to
peg their currencies to a basket of hard currencies (say, a mix of the
dollar and the euro), rather than just to the dollar, might stabilize
fixed exchange rate regimes. For example, pegging to a bundle of
currencies could take the form of a currency board that redeems a
fixed bundle of ‘‘hard’’ currencies in exchange for the domestic one.
A bundle of currencies is potentially superior as an anchor because
its value is more stable. A productivity shock in the United States that
produces a real exchange rate appreciation for the dollar won’t produce
as large an imbalance with emerging market countries if the hard-
currency bundle includes the currencies of countries other than the
United States which are not experiencing that productivity shock. So a
stable European currency could contribute to overall financial stability.
Furthermore, the introduction of the euro could produce a one-
time depreciation of the dollar, which immediately could take some
pressure off emerging market countries pegged to the dollar.
The Problem of Credibility
Is this rosy scenario plausible? It depends on whether Europe will
produce, or be expected to produce, a truly ‘‘hard’’ currency to com-
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pete with the dollar as a numeraire and a store of value, within and
outside Europe. The fiasco produced by France over the management
of the new central bank, and the willingness of the Germans to cede
to those demands, raises strong doubts about any immediate use of
the euro as a competing international store of value. The long-run
prospects for the euro to become a hard currency are unclear, and I
am rather pessimistic, both because of the apparent weakness of
Germany in opposing French pushiness, and because credible policy
rules to insulate the euro from fiscal shocks in member countries have
not been laid out, and likely will not be in the future.
Euro-optimists should bear in mind that currency unions not only
can begin, but also can collapse. The United States (a currency union
mandated by its Constitution, and defensible by force of arms, if
necessary) is the successful historical exception among history’s
attempts to create a common numeraire from a variety of local ones.
Unlike the case of the United States, European members of the
monetary union will retain the option to exit. That not only means
that the monetary union may fall apart; it also means that the (implicit
or explicit) threat of exit will be used by member countries to influence
monetary policy, and thus keep the currency from becoming a reliable
international anchor.
My concerns about member countries’ meddling into central bank
policy go beyond the occasional fudging of medium-run targets
because of differences in unemployment rates across countries. I am
concerned primarily about the absence of credible constraints that
would limit the long-run monetization of deficits, and the way cross-
country differences in the taste for the long-run level of inflation will
undermine the currency union.
Structural Weaknesses
As the rules currently stand, there remains some uncertainty regard-
ing the amounts of each country’s government securities that will be
purchased by the central bank, and the formula for how the seignorage
(the profits from holding those securities) will be distributed among
member countries. Let’s assume (as is likely) that securities will be
purchased and revenues will be shared on an equal (proportionate to
GDP) basis.
This arrangement leaves a lot of room for inflationary mischief
resulting from the monetization of deficits. Monetary union will
encourage countries whose tastes lean more toward monetizing deficits
to press harder for monetization. Soft-money members will recognize
that the costs to inflating are now lower because their neighbors are
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also forced to inflate alongside them. Inflation will no longer be one
of the competitive tools used by governments to compete in attracting
multinational enterprises. Why will hard-money members agree to
inflate? The threat of exit by soft-money countries will be used success-
fully (for a time) to gain acquiescence by hard-money members of
the union for higher inflation.
The amount of deficit monetization that is likely to occur in the
future is greater than one would estimate from current levels of
European deficits, for three reasons. First, because monetary union
will reduce the costs to a fiscally irresponsible government of monetiz-
ing its deficit, monetary union will encourage larger deficits in the
future.
Second, running larger deficits increases the bargaining power over
inflationary policy of soft-money countries by making their exit threats
more credible. Soft-money countries can use large deficits to bolster
their threats to exit—pointing to the possibility that they will ‘‘have
to’’ exit from the European Monetary Union to monetize those deficits
unilaterally unless hard-money countries agree to joint monetization.
The threat of exit is more credible if a member country’s present
value of tax revenues net of expenditures (which, they will argue, are
constrained by domestic politics) is inadequate to repay its future
debt service costs. Thus running higher deficits makes the threat of
exit more credible, and makes it easier for soft-money countries to
push for monetization.
Third, large contingent liabilities of soft-money members are already
looming on the horizon. What expenditures are most likely to produce
the enormous fiscal deficits that will weaken, and ultimately undermine,
the euro? The two most important categories of off–balance sheet fiscal
risk are pension systems and banking systems.
As Jonathan Gruber and David Wise (1998) show, the pension
systems of some of Europe’s economic giants are heading for disaster
in the not-too-distant future. High retirement benefits are encouraging
declining labor participation, which is adding to the fiscal problems
the pension funds face. The unused labor capacity of workers between
the ages of 55 and 65 is 67 percent in Belgium, 60 percent in France,
59 percent in Italy, and 58 percent in Netherlands, compared to 48
percent in Germany and 37 percent in the United States. The potential
for a massive fiscal expenditure to bail out insolvent pension systems
poses a severe threat, and the threat is larger in some countries than
in others.
Potential bank bailouts are another source of large deficits. Here,
too, Italy and France are among the most vulnerable. The banking
sectors of France and Italy are among the weakest in Europe, and
447
CATO JOURNAL
they will come under increasing pressure from the competing Dutch,
Spanish, German, and British banks. Large and growing bank bailouts
(following the examples of Credit Lyonnais and Banco di Napoli) are
a distinct possibility over the next few years.
Thus, big declines in the euro against the dollar, and the eventual
collapse of the euro, will most likely coincide with ballooning fiscal
problems from off–balance sheet government liabilities, not changes
in on–balance sheet taxation and expenditure which receive so much
attention from many macroeconomists and the press. The need to
redefine fundamentals to include off–balance sheet fiscal risks is one
of the primary lessons of the exchange rate collapses in Asia, Mexico,
and many other countries over the past two decades. It is a lesson
that remains to be learned in Europe (and by some influential macroe-
conomists in the United States, as discussed in Calomiris 1998).
Eventually, one or more hard-money members will tire of suffering
the costs of inflation. The intolerance for continuing inflation in the
hard-money members will lead them to exit the system. While the
(implicit or explicit) threats to exit will come mainly from soft-money
members in the early years of the European Monetary Union, it will
ultimately be the hard-money members who force its dissolution.
Can Reform Help?
Can anything be done to address the structural weaknesses I have
described? Realistically, probably not much. I can imagine three
reforms that could conceivably help to forestall problems, and make
it more likely that the euro would become a hard currency—but two
of these possible reforms are very unlikely, and the third is positively
far-fetched. The unlikely ones are (1) implementing immediate credi-
ble solutions to pension system insolvency and (2) bringing market
discipline into Europe’s banking regulation. Market discipline would
require, minimally, a credible subordinated debt requirement as a
part of bank capital standards. (For details, see Calomiris 1997). Weak
banks, of course, do not like the idea of market discipline, so this is
not a policy likely to be greeted enthusiastically by Europe’s powerful
bankers. And the anticipated cross-subsidization coming from mone-
tary union removes the incentives of the fiscally weak to undertake
the costly process of banking or pension reform.
The third (and most far-fetched) reform would be to implement
credible rules for open market operations and seignorage sharing that
would discourage fiscal profligacy and the monetization of deficits by
the union. It would be logically feasible (see the appendix for details)
to set a rule that would link the fiscal risk created by a member
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country to its share of seignorage from the euro. That is, suppose that
higher fiscal risk (defined as an increased possibility that future taxes
will not pay future government debt service costs) led automatically
to a dumping of some portion of that government’s bonds by the
central bank, and a reduced share for that country in the seignorage
created by the central bank. It is even conceivable that the creation
of fiscal risk could be penalized by fees in addition to losses of seignor-
age revenue.
Such a rule might discourage fiscal profligacy and thereby make
deficits, and their monetization, less likely. But this proposed rule for
sharing seignorage and penalizing fiscal risk, while interesting to think
about and possibly effective in principle, is politically almost unimagin-
able. The conflicting goals of the governments within the union, and
the weak political will of Germany to demand concessions from France
and others, would be an insurmountable hurdle to imposing a rule
for ‘‘incentivized’’ seignorage sharing (especially since such a rule
would require amending the Maastricht agreement). The union would
be very unlikely to establish a rule that would discourage soft-money
countries from running deficits, or to enforce such a rule if somehow
it were established.
Conclusion
I predict that the euro will be a weak currency (one that will not
retain its value against the dollar), and that it will not be a permanent
currency. Ultimately, the euro will most likely be remembered neither
as a textbook example of the social gains of properly defining the
optimal currency area nor as the harbinger of global exchange rate
stability, but rather as an illustration of the importance of fiscal disci-
pline for monetary credibility, and as a monetary example of the
tragedy of the commons.
European union will likely strengthen the attraction of the dollar
as a numeraire and a store of value. Countries outside of Europe will
continue to peg their exchange rates to the dollar. And when the
European Monetary Union ultimately collapses, it will itself provide
a positive shock to the real dollar exchange rate that will hurt countries
that have pegged to the dollar. All of this is unfortunate from the
standpoint of global macroeconomic stability—an example of how
political constraints that limit rational policy and encourage public
profligacy make the global economy less stable than it otherwise
would be.
What could Europe do to promote its own interests and improve
global financial market efficiency? Rather than focus on risky attempts
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at reforming monetary policy—ironically, an area where there is prob-
ably relatively little to be gained from reform—more emphasis should
be placed on a fundamental redesigning of Europe’s inefficient core
institutions of commercial law, corporate governance, and banking.
Reforms that would strengthen the rights of shareholders and debt-
holders (including bankruptcy reforms) should be a top priority. Here
France and Italy especially have much to learn from Great Britain
(for details see La Porta et al. 1997). Allowing European-based compa-
nies to choose which country’s securities, banking, and commercial
laws apply to them (a proposal akin to Romano’s [1998] recent proposal
for promoting regulatory competition within the United States) would
be a wonderful first step toward spurring the reform of core economic
institutions. That kind of economic integration would really make a
difference for Europe, and provide an example of the constructive role
of institution building to be imitated by emerging market countries.
Appendix
This appendix outlines a means for limiting the risk of deficit moneti-
zation within a monetary union by linking the seignorage earned by
a member country to the amount of fiscal risk it creates.
Fiscal ‘‘insolvency’’ risk for a member country is defined as the
probability that the member country will be unable to meet future
debt service obligations from its net future taxes and ‘‘normal seignor-
age’’ (the amount earned if all members follow a noninflationary
monetary policy rule).
A member that is perceived as fiscally insolvent must either change
its tax and expenditure policies to become fiscally solvent, exit the
monetary union and inflate unilaterally (raise new inflation taxes from
unilateral seignorage), or remain in the monetary union by convincing
other countries to jointly inflate.
Assume that with probability p an insolvent member will be able
to convince other members to jointly inflate (through higher euro
money growth) in order to keep it in the union.
Initially, at the onset of the monetary union assume that all countries
are fiscally solvent. The objective is to make countries react to an
initial deficit shock with an increase in direct taxation by penalizing
a member country (through a reduction in seignorage share from
operating the European Central Bank, and possibly an additional fee)
if it does not respond to a deficit shock with sufficient taxation.
This policy will only work for some, perhaps unrealistic, parameter
values. If initial p is large (sufficiently close to 1) the rule will be
useless, since ultimately the coalition will likely absorb members’
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deficits. But if a member’s p is sufficiently small initially, if the first
derivative of p with respect to that country’s deficits is not too large and
positive, if fiscal imbalances develop sufficiently slowly and persistently
over time (so that the costs of current forgone seignorage are large
compared to the gains of future monetization), and if feasible penalties
can be sufficiently large, then the cost imposed on members that
increase fiscal risk could provide adequate incentives to limit fiscal risk.
How will fiscal risk be measured, and how will seignorage shares
be reduced (or fees assessed) as a function of that risk? One simple
approach would be to use market measures of fiscal risk as a basis
for varying seignorage shares and penalties. For example, in a two-
country model (for simplicity) where penalties are limited only to lost
seignorage, the seignorage share of country 1 (bounded by zero and
one, and equal to one minus the seignorage share of country 2) would
be a function of the relative yields of 30-year ‘‘legal tender’’ bonds
issued by the two countries. As the relative bond yield of a country
rises, its seignorage share falls. If additional penalties are feasible,
that implies that the feasible range of seignorage shares would include
negative values.
‘‘Legal tender bonds’’ rather than euro-denominated bonds would
be used here to measure fiscal risk because doing so would maximize
the responsiveness of market yields to market perceptions of fiscal
risk. All member countries would be required to issue a fixed percent-
age (say, 10 percent) of their government debt in the form of legal
tender bonds. A legal tender bond has the following structure: it pays
in whatever currency is the legal tender of the country at the time
of the delivery of the bond coupon or principal payment. If the country
switches from the euro to some other currency at some point in the
future, all future bond payments would be converted into that currency
at the currency conversion ratio prevailing at the time of the currency
change. Thus bond payments would not be indexed. If a member
country exited the system in order to inflate its currency (after suffering
a fiscal insolvency and being unable to convince other members to
monetize it within the currency union), then the real value of the
promised payments on the bond would fall. For a discussion of the
use of legal tender bonds in United States history, see Garber (1986)
and Calomiris (1991).
That structure ensures that the ex ante yield on the bond will provide
information about market perceptions of the member country’s fiscal
affairs. Of course, this plan can work only if there is a sufficiently
large probability that soft-money countries will be forced to exit the
monetary union. Yields on these bonds would not reflect fiscal risk
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if p41, since in that case countries would never have to exit as the
result of insolvency.
The usefulness of simple yield differentials to provide information
about the relative fiscal risks of countries requires that countries suffer
similar risks of being forced to exit the monetary union as the result
of fiscal insolvency. For example, if the union were more likely to
bail out France than to bail out Spain, then French yields would rise
less than Spanish yields for any given change in fiscal risk. Thus a
seignorage sharing rule that treats all countries equally may unfairly
discriminate against smaller countries (whose bargaining power is
weaker because their membership is not vital to the perpetuation of
the union).
As noted in the text, in practice this plan is far-fetched. Initial
values of p may be too large (at least for some countries—like France
and Italy) to make seignorage penalties effective deterrents. Second,
the rule is unlikely to pass, since some countries would probably
oppose it. Germany and Netherlands would gain from its passage
more than others, while France and Italy might lose on net if the
rule were passed. Furthermore, it is hard to construct rules that ensure
enforcement by the central bank (one should not underestimate the
creativity of bureaucrats when defining the meaning of inconve-
nient statutes).
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